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Airline Deregulation
After four decades of regulation, domestic
air transportation was largely deregulated
upon passage ofthe Airline Deregulation
Act (ADA) in 1978. Critics ofderegulation
policy pointoutthat, since 1978, there have
been major bankruptcies in the industry,
unstable fares, labor contract disruptions
and loss ofservice to small communities.
Other critics fear a gradual monopolization
ofthe industry and the ultimate onsetof
higher fares and inferiorservice. These
concerns together motivated recent Con-
gressional proposals to "reregulate" the
airline industry. This Weekly Letter is a
critique ofthe rationale for reregulation.
Economic regulation
Priorto 1978, the domestic operations of
U.S. airlinesweresubjecttoeconomic regu-
lation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
The CAB regulated the level and structureof
fares, drawingon historical operating cost
information to make its determinations. The
CABalso restricted entryofnewcarriers into
the industry or into individual markets
(routes). In fact, in the forty years of regula-
tion, essentially no newentry occurred in
scheduled service on major routes.
Economists argued that the lackofthe threat
ofcompetitive entry dampened incentives
for efficient airline operations. In addition,
restrictionson pricecompetition caused air-
lines to vie for market share in the non-price
dimensionsofservice, such as schedule
frequency, provision ofnon-stop service,
and in-flight and airport amenities. The end
result, theyargued, was that airlinescharged
fares that were too high, offered inefficient
service levels, and paid too little attention to
controlling labor and otheroperating costs.
Deregulation
Viewed from this perspective, most ofthe
events that have followed the passage ofthe
Airline Deregulation Act of1978 were
expected and desirable consequences of
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deregulation. First, downward pressure on
fares increased as airlines began to engage
in price competition. Despite a sharp rise in
fuel prices in 1979, fare revenues rose much
less rapidly than costs (see Chart 1).
Second, airlines reduced the underuse of
service capacity induced by regu lation.
Load factors (the percentage ofseats sold
compared to total seats available) rose
sharply after deregulation from about 56
percent to 64 percent for carriers on major
routes. Nonstop service was reduced and
new "hub and spoke" service configura-
tions were initiated to such cities as Kansas
City, St. Louis and Denver. Although
configurations are less convenient for the
traveler, they permit an increase in service
efficiency and lowerfares. The fact that air
travel rose afterderegulation despite weak
overall economic conditions indicates that
the publicclearlyprefersthe combinationof
lowerfares and more spartan service.
New, aggressive entry also occurred with
deregulation as twenty-five newcarriers
entered trunk and regional service between
1978 and 1982. The attractiveness ofthe
industry to entrepreneurs is reflected in the
trend of prices for versatile, medium-haul,
used aircraft, (e.g., Boeing 727-200). Their
prices appearto have risen sharply after
deregulation even after accounting for the
effects ofgeneral inflation (see Chart 2).
Overall, these events contributed to a con-
tinued increase in employmentinthe airline
industry of about 40,000 in the first two
years after the deregulation compared with
growthofonly20,000 inthepriortwoyears.
Pricewars?
Airfares have fallen particularly sharply on
the long, intercoastal routes. Indeed, itis not
unusual for aSan Francisco to NewYorkfare
to be lowerthan that on a route halfthe
length. Critics ofderegulation see such
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denceofthe inherent instabiIityofthe airI ine
industry underderegulation. In an ideally
competitive market, episodic price "war-
ring" should not be expected to occur.
However, an inherently unstable market
structure is probably not the most likely
explanation for the current pricing behavior
ofairlines. One alternative explanation for
thediscount fare "wars" on the intercoastal
routes relates to the composition of airline
fleets. Airlines had purchased large numbers
of wide-bodied aircraft intending them for
use on a varietyofhigh density routes. In
1979, however, the large increase in fuel
prices made these aircraft uneconomical to
operate on al I butthe longest routes. In
essence, the industry may have found itself
with excess "long-haul" capacity, and has
tried to increase its passenger loads through
aggressive fare cutting. Ifthis explanation is
correct, the intercoastal fare "wars" should
abate as the carriers recompose theirfleets.
Headed for monopoly?
Much depends, ofcourse, on the ultimate
structureofthe industry. In spite ofthe large
numberofnewcarriers that started opera-
tion after deregulation, critics point to the
high rates ofbankruptcies in the airline
industryand are concerned thatthe industry
may end up dominated by a few very large
firms with littlecompetition on individual
routes. Indeed, even before deregulation,
most domestic non-stop routes were served
by only one carrier. However, there is little
theoretical orempirical evidence to support
this fear.
On low and moderate traffic routes, econo-
mies ofscale probablydo dictate that only
one carrier will be ableto serve the route
efficiently. However, as a numberofecon-
omists, including Keeler and PanzaI' have
pointed out, the provision of service by a
monopolistdoes not necessariIy mean that
he will beableto exploitmonopolypowerif
there is arealistic threatofcompetitiveentry.
Competitive entry, in turn, will be more
likely ifthere are relatively low barriers to
such entry.
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In the airline industry, such barriers are
usually lowbecause the firms' airlinecapital
is uniquelymobile: an airplanecan be rede-
ployed on a new route relatively easily. It is
not "fixed" to a physical location as in the
case ofa plant in the manufacturing indus-
try. Even monopolysuppliers ofservice on a
route always face the potential ofentry by
carriers from other parts ofthe industry, and
their behavior will be constrained accor-
dingly. This notion of "contestability" of
monopolized markets was examined by
economistGerald Kaplan in a study ofthe
fares on individual routes afterderegulation.
Kaplan found that actual and potential entry
protected the market from the exercise of
monopoly poweron thinly served routes.
Nor is there evidence that concentration
in airtransportation is increasing for the
industry as a wholeoron individual routes.
In 1982, the share oftraffic,: provided bythe
largest five carriers was only67 percent,
versus 69 percent priorto deregulation. In
addition, in a study of300 individual airline
markets, economists Graham, Kaplan and
Silby found that, in general, marketconcen-
tration had eitherdecreased or remained
unchanged since deregulation.
Small community service
Free entry and exit underderegulation
raised adifferentconcern in small commun-
ities. Such communities feared the total loss
ofservice once CAB service requirements
were abandoned. Economists had argued
thatalthough thetypeofservice (i.e., aircraft
and schedule frequency) and fares might
change, entrepreneurs still would find
means ofserving these markets. Neverthe-
less, the Airline Deregulation Act contained
a provision fortransitory subsidies to carriers
serving small markets.
In most cases, the fear ofwholesale aban-
donmentofsmall communityservice has
proved to be exaggerated. In those cases in
which there was significant loss ofservice
(such as in the Bakersfield, California
market) the loss was due to peculiarmanifestations ofthe transition from a
regulated to a deregulated environment,
such as the bankruptcy of a major carrier.
Even in these cases, newentry usually
provided replacement service.
In many cases, the increased post-deregula-
tion competition has actually improved the
qualityof service to these communities. For
example, arecentsurveyof72 communities
where majorcarriers had terminated service
showed thatflightfrequencies increased by
30 percent between 1978 and 1981 due to
an increase in commuter carrier service.
labor wrangles and bankruptcy
The recent bankruptcies and labor disputes
also are more likely to be characteristics of
the transition toderegulation than indicators
ofthe inherent instability ofthe industry..
Underregulation, restrictions on the entry
and exitoffirms amplified the bargaining
powerofairline labor. An airline could not
leave the industry without losing its operat-
ingauthority; itthuscould notuse thethreat
ofdeclaringbankruptcy to reorganize in the
subsequent bargaining process. The restric-
tions on entry under regulation also protec-
ted the negotiating position of airline labor.
Entry restrictions removed the threatthat
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new low-costentrants would erode the
marketshare oftheexistingcarriers, thereby
blunting the incentivesto cut costs by the
regu lated carriers.
Deregulation wouId be expected therefore
notonlyto increaseoperatingefficiency, but
also toputdownward pressure on theprices
oflabor and other inputs. During the transi-
tion period, the advantages··of lower input
prices are available largely to newentrants, .
since older carriers may be bound by carie
tractual agreements. As a result, a new car-
rier in the Northeastern U.s., for example, can
operate at approximately one halfthe cost
per seat mileofits established counterparts.
Facing such low-costrivalry, it is notsurpris-
ing therefore thatmajorcarriers havesought
to find ways ofrenegotiating theirwage bill.
In one case, this was accomplished by a
recent 18 percent negotiated wage reduc-
tion; in another, wage reductions were
soughtas partofatotal financial reorganiza-
tion. This process is likely to continue until
all producers face a similar cost environ-
ment, atwhich point newentry will
probably slow and the labor marketwill
likely become more stable.
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Selected Assets and liabilities
Large Commercial Banks o ar ercen
Loans, leasesand Investments' 2 175,497 110 - 528 - 1.7
loansand leases! 5 155,132 153 - 222 - 0.8
Commercial and Industrial 45,813 333 - 150 - 1.8
Real estate 59.163 - 5 264 2.5
Loans to Individuals 26,824 91 174 3.6
leases 5,003 - 7 - 59 - 6.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,225 - 55 - 281 - 12.5
Other Securities2 8,139 12 - 23 - 1.6
Total Deposits 183,973 -1,300 - 7,023 - 20.3
Demand Deposits 42,411 -1,637 - 6,825 - 76.7
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 27,492 -2,317 - 3,838 - 67.8
Other Transaction Balances4 11,930 - 80 - 844 - 36.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances 129,630 416 645 2.8
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 40,278 177 681 9.5
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 or more 38,016 214 - 148 - 2.2









Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings










1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes tradingaccount securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB,TI&l notes, Fed Funds, RPs and othersources
6 Includes items notshown separately
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